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Stefano Simonetta
1. If we deal with the problem of Aristotle’s ‘Christianisation’ in light of the
late-medieval commentaries to the Politics, then the question takes on a rather
peculiar form: rather than wondering – as we have been asked to do by the or-
ganisers of this seminar – which hermeneutic strategies were used by medieval
commentators to bring out and valorise the elements of Aristotelian thought
that are most easily adaptable to Christian perspective, we should ask ourselves
to what extent Pauline and Augustinian political theology influenced the kind
of reading that the 13th- and 14th-century magistri made of the Politics (and
the Ethics). It is mainly a question of reconstructing the way in which that tra-
dition was grafted onto Aristotle’s thought and used, deliberately so, with the
aim of ‘bending’ and adapting certain Aristotelian statements, especially those
relating to the positive nature of involving the mass in the government of the
public good, thereby neutralising some potentially dangerous elements.
The most emblematic case is undoubtedly that of Peter of Auvergne. In his
writings we encounter an ideological use of the Christian political doctrine
that had dominated almost unopposed for nearly a millennium, up until the
mid-13th century. It was a doctrine founded, as is well-known, upon radical
Augustinian anthropological pessimism, from which stemmed the idea that
the earthly rulers were the instruments of providence – a bitter yet salubrious
∗. In the following pages I have tried to comply as closely as possible with the indications of
those who have had the merit of promoting the study seminar at the heart of this volume, a
seminar thought of as an initial reconnaissance with the purpose of ascertaining the possible
existence of common research lines on the issue of the Christian rereadings of Aristotle, with
special attention addressed to the commentaries; and in fact what I present here are simply
a series of ideas that I hope to analyse more deeply in the future. I would like to take this
opportunity to thank Prof. Luca Bianchi and Prof. Sylvia Notini.
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medicine – to whom the divine scheme of things had given the task of coun-
tering the damage caused by the Fall and keeping forcibly1 at bay a humanity
seen as a mass of sinners (“massa peccati”) or, to borrow another of Augus-
tine’s images, like a “school of fish” engaged in devouring one another2.
Now, if we focus first and foremost on the ample portion of the commentary
on the Politics authored by Peter (finished by 1295), we can say that he makes
use of the Pauline-Augustinian tradition in order to endorse his own interpre-
tation of the Aristotelian analysis of the constitutions, and to dispel any doubts
over the undeniably pro-monarchical orientation that he attributes to Aristo-
tle. In his discourse, the frequent implicit references to Augustine’s anthro-
pological conception are functional to putting back in perspective the impor-
tance of the pages of the Politics where some aspects are examined according
to which the majority government appears to be placed before the other con-
stitutional forms (cf. Pol., III, 11, 1281 a 40 - 1281 b 10). In order to understand
what Aristotle really means when he states that “perhaps” the mass of citizens
has a greater right to uphold the State than do the better, when he says that
the many – taken collectively – may prove to be more suited to ruling than a
limited number of particularly virtuous men, Peter of Auvergne considers to
be unavoidable the distinction between two categories of multitude, distinc-
tion which he draws from an instance given in a passage of the Politics (III,
11, 1281 b 20-22) where it is stated that some populaces do not seem to differ
from beasts in any way, whereas, if it is referred to other masses of individu-
als, nothing prevents the thesis according to which it is the many who must be
sovereign from being true3.
Apparet enim quod duplex est multitudo. Una quidem bestialis, in qua
nullus habet rationem vel modicam, sed inclinatur ad bestiales actus; et
manifestum est, quod istam non expediat dominari aliquo modo, quia
1. The sword that St. Paul reminds the Romans “is not wielded in vain”.
2. Cf. Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, I, ii, 16, in CCL 44,
A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout, 1970, p. 42/469, and Id., Enarrationes in
Psalmos, LXIV, 9, in CCL 39, E. Dekkers, J. Fraipont (eds), Brepols, Turnhout, 1956,
p. 832 / 16 - 27.
3. As concerns the importance of such a distinction in Peter of Auvergne’s thought, consider
J. Dunbabin, The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics, in N. Kretzmann, A.
Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 726 - 727 and 733, L. Lanza, Aspetti della ricezione
della “Politica” aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in Studi Medievali, ser. III, 35
(1994), pp. 643 - 694 and C. Fiocchi, Dispotismo e libertà nel pensiero politico medievale.
Riflessioni all’ombra di Aristotele (sec. XIII-XIV), Lubrina, Bergamo, 2007, pp. 61 - 75. More
generally, on Peter’s commentary, see C. Martin, Some Medieval Commentaries on Aris-
totle’s Politics, in History, 36 (1951), pp. 38 - 40 and L.W. Daly, Medieval and Renaissance
Commentaries on the Politics of Aristotle, in Duquesne Review, 13 (1968), pp. 42 - 44.
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sine ratione est et coniunctim et divisim. Alia est multitudo ubi omnes
aliquid habent rationis et inclinantur ad prudentiam, et bene suasibiles
sunt a ratione; et talem expedit magis dominari, quam paucos virtuosos.
Quamvis enim quilibet non sit virtuosus, tamen quod fit ex omnibus cum
conveniunt, est virtuosum. Et sic apparet solutio quaestionis4.
Peter of Auvergne therefore binds the validity of the Aristotelian stance in
favour of the involvement of the populace in government to a careful evalu-
ation of the moral level and the degree of rationality of the specific masses to
which it is applied. He distinguishes between the cases in which trust can be
put in a multitudo whose members all have as much rationality as to make
them inclined to prudence – and to induce them to heeding whomever speaks
according to reason – and those cases for whom we are instead in the presence
of a set of individuals naturally inclined to animal-like behaviour, giving rise
to a wholly irrational multitude, both considering those by which it is made up
and taking them as a whole.
Having made this important distinction, Auvergne can quite serenely un-
derwrite Aristotle’s considerations as regards the superiority of a regime where
many give their contribution, in such a way as to form a “near perfect” man5,
both from the standpoint of his intellectual qualities and from that of his eth-
ical virtues, just as there is no dinner more successful than the one where ev-
eryone brings something, nor is there a musical composition superior to the
one made up of several people together.
Dicit quod si sint multi non virtuosi simpliciter, cum convenient in
aliquod unum, facient unum aliquod studiosum [. . . ] et sunt aliquid
melius quam quilibet divisim acceptus. Et hoc declaravit per simile;
et dicit, quod sicut illi qui faciunt coenam ad communes expensas et
quilibet modicum apportat, quod autem collectum est ex omnibus
apportatis magnae quantitatis est, sic est in proposito, si sint multi et
quilibet aliquid habeat virtutis et prudentiae, cum convenerint in unum
facient unum aliquid magnum et virtuosum. In quo enim unus deficit,
contingit alterum abundare6.
4. Peter of Auvergne, In libros Politicorum expositio, lib. iii, lect. 9, in S. Thomae Aquinatis
Doctoris Angelici in octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio, R.M. Spiazzi (ed.), Marietti,
Torino - Roma, 1966, 427, p. 151. Cf. also Peter of Auvergne, Questiones in libros Politico-
rum, lib. iii, q. 15, ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, latin 16089, f. 295va and ivi, iii, q. 17,
f. 296ra.
5. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 8, 424, p. 148.
6. Ibid.: “Et – the text continues, a little further on – adducit aliud simile: dicens, quod propter
hoc quod multi sunt aliquid melius iuncti, quam quilibet illorum, contingit quod opera mu-
sicalia, et opera poëtarum melius facta sunt et ducta ad perfectionem per plures quam per
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Peter reports these statements while in no way relinquishing his pro-
monarchical bias, as in his opinion they merely outline an extreme hypothesis
and, in essence, they lie on an abstract plane. Indeed, to his eyes the number
of cases in which the conditio sine qua non to be able to give the many a form
of dominion within the community, that is, cases in which there is human
material actually available endowed with the qualities needed to govern,
seems to be negligible percentage-wise7. Instead, the overwhelming majority
of the political communities already existing seemed to him to fall fully within
the list of what he calls “vile” or “bestial masses”8, in that on the inside they
are without a core of wise and virtuous individuals capable of conferring to
the rest of the multitude the ability to act according to right reason9: Peter
thus considers them in the condition of a political minority wholly akin to
what was ascribed to every civitas by early medieval political thought10.
Two aspects should thus be underlined concerning our author’s way of ar-
guing. On the one hand, he places at the centre of his discourse, attributing
it with a decisive role, a distinction that Aristotle had only briefly mentioned
– the one between “multitudo rationalis” (orderly good) and “multitudo bes-
tialis” (chaotic) – a distinction that, in his thought, in practice replaces the con-
trast between the Edenic condition and that triggered by the Fall. On the other
hand, as has been said, he firmly emphasises the ease with which one comes
up against irrational, degraded masses, whose members present conspicuous
intellectual failings (“parum rationis habent”11) and are distinguished by the
interior disorder that the Augustinian tradition deemed to be the indelible
hallmark of humankind: a disorder as a result of which reason is prey to ap-
petites and passions, and thus, moving from the single individual to the kind
of macro-human plane that is the political community, the populace appear to
be wholly unsuited, in Peter’s eyes, to being able to fill any political role and
are absolutely needful of an outside guide12.
unum. Sic enim inventae fuerunt artes et scientiae; quia primo unus invenit aliquid et illud
tradidit et forte inordinate: alius post hoc accepit illud et addidit et totum tradidit et magis
ordinate, et sic consequenter donec perfecte artes et scientiae inventae sunt”.
7. Cf. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 11, 459, p. 162: “Ubi possibile erit invenire talem mul-
titudinem”.
8. See for example Questiones in libros Politicorum, iii, 17, f. 296ra.
9. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 8, 426, p. 149: “Et in tali multitudine non est verum, quod
ex illis hominibus possit fieri aliquid virtuosum, si conveniant in unum”.
10. A tradition that – as has already been anticipated – considered the effects of original sin
as irreconcilable with any solution that acknowledges the right to self-government to the
different communities and, on the contrary, identified the only viable path as that of placing
each of those communities under the protection of a leader chosen for them (unilaterally) by
God, through the mediation of the high clergy.
11. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 8, 426, p. 149.
12. That is to say, naturally servile: led by his nature to submit himself meekly to the govern-
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Confirmation of this comes from some terminological differences that can
be detected between the original Aristotelian text and Auvergne’s Commen-
tary, differences that the critical literature has already had the opportunity to
dwell upon: in particular I am referring to the frequent recourse to expressions
from which we get the distinct impression that, unlike Aristotle, our author
considers it highly unlikely to be able to identify a multitudo capable of taking
on government functions13.
Closely connected to this pessimism, which we could call politico-
anthropological (of an Augustinian provenance), is another of the themes
that constitute the significant feature of Peter’s commentaries to the Politics,
that is to say the idea according to which, when one can count on an
outstanding candidate for the leadership of the State, it no longer has the
slightest importance to verify what the nature of all the other members of the
community is, there is no need to worry about studying the way it is made
up; the possible presence of an individual who distinguishes himself from the
rest of the civitas by virtue automatically makes it useless as well as harmful
to attribute any government role to the multitude14. In Peter’s opinion, this is
the reason why Aristotle wanted to premise a dubitative formula to the lines
where he justifies the decision to entrust the masses with the choice of the
magistrates and the assessment of their work: “dicit «forsan», quia in politia,
in qua est unus excellens in virtute, et alii nati sibi obedire, non expedit
multitudinem attingere ad ista”15.
In similar cases, a situation thus arises in which an entire populace must
ment of a despot. Cf. Questiones in libros Politicorum, iii, 17, f. 296rb, where Peter spoke of
“multitudo bestialis impersuasibilis de qua prius dixit Philosophus, quod nata est servire
principatu despotico”.
13. Where, for example, Aristotle introduces with the words “nihil prohibet” the infinitives in
which the superiority of a government that involves the many is claimed (Pol., III, 11, 1281b 21
and 13, 1283b 34-35), Peter paraphrases the passages in question allowing the same infinitives
to be held both by a more prudent “contingit” (cf. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 8,
426, p. 149) or, elsewhere, a “possibile est” (ivi, iii, 11, 459, p. 161). In regard to this matter,
we should bear in mind the considerations made in L. Lanza, Aspetti della ricezione della
“Politica”, p. 679.
14. Even if one were to find oneself in the presence of a multitude “in qua omnes attingunt ad
rationem”: “Intelligendum est – Peter points out – quod quamvis multi conveniant in virtute
et disciplina, oportet tamen quandoque unum principari principatu regali. Est enim aliqua
multitudo virtuosorum, et haec dignitatem habet, et dicitur multitudo politica; alia est quae
deficit a ratione multum, et haec dicitur dominativa. Utramque expedit regi principatu re-
gali: primam, inquantum est unus qui excedit omnes alios in virtute; aliam autem expedit
regi uno, inquantum est aliquis qui excedit omnes alios in virtute” (In libros Politicorum
expositio, iii, 16, 525, pp. 184 - 185).
15. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 9, 438, p. 153; cf. also ivi, 435, p. 152.
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obey, “quasi dominativo principatu”16, the only element of the community
that, in Peter of Auvergne’s description, seems to be immune to the effects
of the Fall17: an “optimus vir” who, within the sort of identikit provided by
our author, moves away from those over whom he is destined to reign for the
fact of having preserved his own inner order and operating “according to the
divine element” which is in man, actualising the intellectual component of his
own being and making it his only directive rule in agibilibus18. This ability to
keep the desires of the body under control, preventing them from subverting
the judgment of reason19, this full self-domination – originally a characteristic
of all human beings – means that now the subject in question is the only one to
endow himself with laws that the other must instead receive from the outside,
that is, from him. We thus find ourselves faced with an extraordinary human
type, to whom Peter’s considerations can be applied in regard to whomever
turns out to be endowed with virtue and political capacity so immeasurable,
as compared with those of the rest of the civil community, as not to even be
considered a member of the State per se, but rather a sort of “god between
men” (cf. Pol., III, 13, 1284a 11).
Lex quae datur in civitate – our author wrote – est necessaria omnibus ae-
qualibus potentia et genere: et hoc patet, quia lex est de conferentibus ad
finem politiae. In his autem non omnes sunt sufficientes se dirigere ex se,
et ideo indigent lege dirigente eos in agibilibus; unde datur lex eis qui sunt
aequales genere et potencia isto modo: quia non sunt sufficientes dirigere
se in actionibus, et isti dicuntur cives: sed talibus, qui sic excedunt alios in
virtute, non datur lex; ipsi enim sunt sibi lex. Et hoc patet, quia lex est or-
dinatio quaedam secundum rationem de conferentibus ad finem politiae:
isti enim ordinationem habent in seipsis, ideo sunt sibi leges. Deriden-
dus igitur esset ille, qui vellet dare legem istis virtuosis, cum in eis non
16. Ibid.: “In regno enim si unus sit simpliciter prudens et alii regantur quasi dominativo prin-
cipatu, ut inferiores obediunt superiori, non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem”.
17. The consequences of which continue to weigh inexorably upon all the others.
18. Cf. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 15, 513, p. 180: “Contingit autem quod homo aliquando
operatur secundum intellectum, ita quod non impeditur a sensu omnino, nec sensu utitur
nisi quantum sibi necessarius est: et tunc dicitur homo simpliciter operari, quia operatur se-
cundum id quod simplicius est in eo. Sed quia indiget sensu, contingit aliquando operationi
intellectus coniungi appetitum sensitivum, et tunc dicitur homo compositus. Et cum homo
operatur secundum intellectum, nec impeditur a sensu, tunc operatur maxime secundum
intellectum et rationem, et secundum divinum aliquid existens. [...] Dicit igitur quod ille
qui praecipit intellectui principari vel hominem secundum intellectum, ita quod non coni-
ungatur appetitus sensitivus aliqualiter retrahens, praecipit velut Deum, hoc est hominem
secundum aliquid divinum principari et legem: qui autem vult hominem principari eum
comitante appetitu sensitivo, apponit bestiam [...]. Sed melius est principari aliquid divinum
quam coniunctum bestiae”.
19. Ibid.: “Cum in appetitu sint passiones pervententes intellectum”.
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sit causa, propter quam lex fertur. Igitur isti sic excellentes, cives non
erunt20.
The decidedly uncommon qualities make each one of the members of this se-
lect category of individuals the ideal candidate to act as monarch for a multi-
tudo that finds in him – naturally21 – the rational guide it needs, the ‘legal tu-
tor’ committed to being the guarantor of that collective interest that the mass
is neither capable of correctly putting into focus, nor of pursuing effectively22.
And it is precisely on the moral exceptionality of the kings that Peter of Au-
vergne bases his belief that the government by one alone would be, absolutely
(“simpliciter”), the best and the “most divine” of the righteous constitutional
forms taken into account by Aristotle23: as has been seen, to support this belief,
he recuperates, significantly, the argumentative methods typical of the early
medieval specula principum and, more in general, the language of Augustinian
political theology, submitting Aristotelian discourse to a manifest curvature24.
2. That said, let’s now move on briefly to Walter Burley, to show how the
two elements that we have identified in Peter of Auvergne, that is, the oppo-
sition between “multitudo rationalis” and “multitudo vilis” and the issue of
the monarch as an extraordinary human type, are dealt with differently, in the
context of a gradual attenuation of the influence exercised on the commen-
taries on the Politics by the Pauline-Augustinian tradition.
20. Ivi, iii, 12, 464, p. 165. In essence, in Peter’s hands the well-known Aristotelian dilemma (ex-
pressed further on: Pol., III, 15, 1286a 7ss.) on the preferability of the government of the best
man or of that of the best laws ends up being partially overcome, to the extent to which the
two horns of the dilemma overlap when we find ourselves having to deal with an individual
so outstanding as to embody the law in himself. Cf. Questiones in libros Politicorum, iii, 25,
f. 298rb-va.
21. Consider also In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 16, 525, p. 184: “Si virtus alicuius excedat
virtutem aliorum, naturale est quod iste sit rex et dominus. [. . . ] Iterum non expedit istum
principari secundum partem, sed omnibus; quia pars non est nata excedere suum totum, sed
iste in virtute excedit omnes alios: ergo alii sunt pars respectu istius”.
22. Peter emphasises how a political set-up that consists in entrusting the leadership of the com-
munity to whomever stands out for virtue among all the others is preferable, as it represents
the solution that comes closest to what happens in living organisms and the cosmos (“illum
oportet magis principari qui accedit magis ad principatum naturalem, et ad principatum
universi”): cf. In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 12, 473, p. 167.
23. The idea of the superiority of the regnum is the load-bearing axis of Peter’s political analysis:
a regnum which, however, in the remote hypothesis – as we know – of being able to count on
a “non-bestial multitude”, is configured as a regimen commixtum in which the predominant
element is, indeed, the monarchic one. As regards this aspect, I wish to refer to S. Simo-
netta, Rimescolare le carte. Il tema del governo misto in Tommaso d’Aquino e nella rifles-
sione politica tardomedievale, in “Montesquieu.it” (http://www.montesquieu.it/main.htm), 1
(2009), pp. 10 - 16.
24. Cf. L. Lanza, Aspetti della ricezione della “Politica”, p. 685.
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Written between 1339 and 1342, Burley’s commentary – as is well-known –
owes a strong debt to the one started by Thomas and completed by Peter, to
the extent that it is often possible to detect a literal dependency between the
two texts. Nevertheless, as regards the issues we are interested in here, we can
observe a significant difference between Burley and his source. It is true that,
when called upon to come to terms with the cautious arguments in favour of
the preference for a government of the many contained in the third book of the
Politics, Walter Burley puts forward the hermeneutic solution already adopted
in Peter’s commentaries, whose keystone is represented by the distinction be-
tween the two classes of multitude, as clearly illustrated in the following lines:
solvit questionem intendens quod multitudo bestialis nullo modo debet
principari sed multitudo hominum qui habent virtutem quamvis imper-
fecte et inclinacionem ad actus virtuosos debet principari25.
At the same time, however, Burley seems to be definitely more optimistic, more
confident than Peter, as concerns the possibility of finding a mass that has the
essential requisites for participating responsibly in government. And, in this
regard, he cites a concrete example – something that Peter carefully avoided
doing – taken from the institutional life of the England of his day and age.
Quod – he wrote – magis conveniens et magis dignum est quod multi-
tudo comprehendens in se consiliarios et iudices, concionatores et alios
prudentes principetur, quam unus vel pauci virtuosi probatur sic: to-
tum est dignius et magis potens quam aliqua eius pars, sed consiliarii
iudices, et sic de aliis sapientibus, sunt partes multitudinis constitute ex
hiis. . . . Intelligendum quod in rectis principatibus aliis a regno princi-
patur multitudo, hoc est plures; et adhuc in regno multitudo, constituta
ex rege et proceribus et sapientibus regni, quodammodo principatur, ita
quod tantum vel magis potest et scit huiusmodi multitudo quam rex so-
lus. Et propter hoc rex convocat parliamentum pro arduis negociis expe-
diendis26.
Burley, thus, does not just theorise the possible involvement of the mass in any
form of government (regnum included), but refers to nascent English parlia-
mentary practice to show how a multitudo at the height of the role can indeed
take part in the leadership of the political community.
25. Walter Burley, Commentarius in VIII Libros Politicorum Aristotelis, lib. iii, tract. 2, cap. 3,
ms. London, British Museum, Royal 10. C. XI, f. 19va. In relation to the same subject, also
consider ivi, f. 18rb.
26. Commentarius, 3, 2, 3, R., f. 19vb.
SEARCHING FOR AN UNEASY SYNTHESIS 281
Even the words with which he praises his sovereign, Edward III, celebrated
as the perfect embodiment of that special type of “almost divine” men so supe-
rior to the rest of the population, in terms of virtue, as to induce all the others
to lend their obedience willingly, with no one needing to feel domineered or
humiliated, even these words of praise, while echoing Peter’s theme of the king-
“optimus vir”, do so in a far less dark perspective: where Peter of Auvergne –
in the wake of Augustinian political theology – presented the monarch as the
pharmakon capable of defusing the effects of the Fall and saving the rest of the
community from itself, heaving it upon his shoulders, Burley projects the im-
age of the king endowed with outstanding qualities against the backdrop of a
conception of government in England seen as the result of a combined action
of the sovereign and his subjects, who, far from having a merely passive role,
“cum-regnant cum rege”27.
Intelligendum est – he wrote, referring to the case where within a partic-
ular civitas there could be someone who surpasses all the other citizens
in political virtue – quod talis, scilicet excellens seu superexcedens in vir-
tute iuste debet principari; tum quia magis excedit ad principem natu-
ralem, cuiusmodi est cor inter membra corporis animalis. . . , tum quia
magis excedit ad principem mundi qui est deus gloriosus. . . . Secundum
notabile est quod superexcellentem in virtute debere principari quia hoc
intelligitur quando in multitudine non invenitur unus talis superexcedens
alios in virtute vel si talis inveniatur et principatur non propter hoc alii
sunt inhonorati. In optima enim policia quilibet propter talem principem
superexcellens28 alios in bono virtutis reputat se multum honoratum et
quilibet diligit gradum suum et contentus est29, et quilibet vult singula-
riter honorem regis et videtur sibi quod in rege et cum rege quasi regnat,
et, propter intimam dileccionem civium ad regem, est intima concordia
inter cives et est regnum fortissimum, sicut hodie patet de rege anglorum,
propter cuius excedentem virtutem est maxima concordia in populo an-
glicano, quia quilibet est contentus de gradu suo sub rege30.
3. Before finishing, as further testimony to the difficulties encountered by those
27. Cf. Commentarius, 3, 2, 3, ms. Oxford, Balliol Coll. 95, f. 184ra. To this regard, see C.J. Neder-
man, Kings, Peers, and Parliament: Virtue and Corulership in Walter Burley’s “Commentarius
in VIII Libros Politicorum Aristotelis”, in Albion, 24 (1992), pp. 391 - 407 and S. Simonetta,
La lunga strada verso la sovranità condivisa in Inghilterra, in Id. (ed.), Potere sovrano: sim-
boli, limiti, abusi, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003, pp. 118 - 122.
28. As in the text.
29. Cf. Peter of Auvergne, In libros Politicorum expositio, iii, 12, 473, p. 166: “Cum talis sit
optimus, dignum et iustum est quod omnes sibi laetanter obediant”.
30. Commentarius, 3, 2, 4, R., ff. 21vb - 22ra.
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who made an effort to conciliate the traditional Christian conception of the
State – seen as a necessary ill, the side-effect of the Fall – and the value at-
tributed to the political dimension by Aristotle, I would like to cite two exam-
ples drawn from texts that may be assimilated to the genre of commentaries
to the Politics, while not strictly falling within it: I am referring to the part of
De regno written by Ptolemy of Lucca (the earliest 14th century) and the first
dictio of Defensor pacis by Marsilius of Padua (finished in 1324).
As regards Ptolemy, I will just point out how his attempt to achieve a syn-
thesis between the two traditions, whose interweaving has been the subject of
my paper31, leads to a distinct curvature in the Pauline-Augustinian-inspired
political theology. Inclined to stress the positive contribution that “the many”
are capable of offering to the government of the political community and con-
vinced that the best constitutional system is a regimen commixtum32, the Do-
minican indeed steps in heavy-handedly in regard to Augustine’s doctrine,
using the faults of the individual populaces – and no longer just, generically,
the original sin – to explain the need that some regions should be subject to
the domination of a monarch whose precious repressive function and absolute
power are translated into a despotic rule; and in this substantial identification
between regal government and despotism (that owes much to I Sam. 833) it
is instead the Christian political conception that has the better over the Aris-
totelian one.
As confirmation of what I have just said, it is enough to bring together two
passages from De regno in which Ptolemy combines Aristotle, St. Paul and
Augustine’s auctoritates to argue, respectively: 1. that the merit of regal rule
is to be found in the efficacy with which it holds back the antisocial instincts
largely prevalent among men, and 2. that, as a matter of fact, the presence
of this dominium is reduced to those cases in which it necessarily takes on a
31. An attempt in regard to which scholars have formulated highly divergent judgements, divid-
ing between those who criticised Ptolemy for not having grasped in their real bearing the
irreconcilable elements contained in Aristotle’s vision and in the Augustinian one and those
who, instead, appreciated the commitment with which he had supposedly tried to “ratio-
nalise” such tension and find a compromise; cf. especially, R.A. Markus, Two Conceptions
of Political Authority: Augustine, ‘De Civitate Dei’, 19.14 - 15 and Some Thirteenth Century
Interpretations, in Journal of Theological Studies, 16 (1965), pp. 96 - 97, and J.M. Blythe,
Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1992, pp. 94 - 99 and 106 - 109.
32. Inside which each element mitigates the others.
33. As regards this aspect, see S. Simonetta, Rimescolare le carte, pp. 18 - 19. For the idea that
the “testimony of the Holy Scriptures” authorises the assimilation of regal dominion and
despotic government (that exerted over a mass of servants), treating them on a par with an
only form of government, see Ptolemy of Lucca, De regimine principum, lib. ii, chap. 9
in Divi Thomae Aquinatis Politica opuscula duo, G. Mathis (ed.), Marietti, Torino-Roma,
19482, pp. 28b - 29a, ivi, iii, 9, p. 48b and iv, 8, p. 76a.
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despotic form, in the geographical areas inhabited by populations that result
to be worthy of such treatment34.
Sed – we read in the first passage – quia perversi difficile corriguntur, et
stultorum infinitus est numerus, ut dicitur in Eccle. cap. 1, 15, in natura
corrupta regimen regale est fructuosius; quia oportet ipsam naturam
humanam, sic dispositam quasi ad suum fluxum, limitibus refraenare.
Hoc autem facit regale fastigium. Unde scriptum est in Prov. XX, 8: Rex,
qui sedet in solio iudicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Virga ergo
disciplinae, quam quilibet timet, et rigor iustitiae sunt necessaria in
gubernatione mundi, quia per ea populus et indocta multitudo melius
regitur. Unde Apostolus ad Rom. XIII, 4, dicit, loquens de rectoribus
mundi, quod non sine causa gladium portat. . . vindex in iram ei qui
malum agit. Et Aristoteles dicit in Ethic., quod “poenae in legibus
institutae sunt medicinae quaedam”. Ergo quantum ad hoc excellit regale
dominium35.
Principatus despoticus – Ptolemy wrote further on – ad regale reduci-
tur [. . . ] praecipue ratione delicti propter quod servitus est introducta,
ut Augustinus dicit lib. XVIII De Civit. Dei. Licet enim etiam primo
statu fuisset dominium, non tamen nisi officio consulendi et dirigendi,
non libidine dominandi vel intentione subiciiendi serviliter. Leges vero
traditae de regali dominio Israelitico populo per Samuelem prophetam,
hac consideratione sunt datae: quia dictus populus propter suam ingra-
titudinem, et quia durae cervicis erat, merebatur tales audire. Interdum
enim dum populus non cognoscit beneficium boni regiminis, expedit
exercere tyrannides, quia etiam hae sunt instrumentum divinae iustitiae:
unde et quaedam insulae et provinciae semper habent tyrannos propter
malitiam populi, quia aliter, nisi in virga ferrea, regi non possunt. In
talibus ergo regionibus sic dyscolis necessarius est regibus principatus
despoticus, non quidem iuxta naturam regalis dominii, sed secundum
merita et pertinacias subditorum. Et ista est ratio Augustini in praedicto
iam libro. Philosophus etiam – our author points out, in whose discourse
tyranny and despotism constitute a single category – in III Polit. ubi dis-
tinguit genera regni, ostendit apud quasdam barbaras nationes regale do-
minium esse omnino despoticum, quia aliter regi non possent36.
34. While in the lands most inclined to freedom, in the zones inhabited by men “of virile na-
ture, who have a brave heart and trust in the strength of their intellect”, the natural solution
consists in the adoption of a “principatus politicus,” in which whoever rules is bound to
abiding by the laws that the community has given itself and hold an elective, temporary and
temperate power; cf. especially, De reg. principum, iv, 8, pp. 75b - 76a.
35. De reg. principum, ii, 9, p. 29a.
36. Ivi, iii, 11, p. 52b.
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Lastly, as concerns Marsilius, the entire first section of his most celebrated
writing is addressed to transforming Aristotelian political philosophy into an
ideological instrument, by using Aristotle’s thesis in an anti-hierocratic way,
i.e. having as its main objective the confutation of the idea that the origin of
every legitimate secular authority lies amid the ecclesiastic leaders37. At the
same time, however, the use of Aristotle to go beyond Aristotle, to integrate
the investigation into the possible causes of the civil discord elaborated in the
fifth book of the Politics taking into consideration a disintegrating factor that
only emerged in the subsequent era, that is, the absolutist claims of the pa-
pacy that like a cancer erode the various political communities38, fits within a
theory of the State that conceives of its genesis in a far more Augustinian than
Aristotelian manner39, as emerges from these lines:
Adam fuit creatus in statu innocencie seu iusticie originalis. . . . In quo
siquidem permansisset, nec sibi aut sue posteritati necessaria fuisset offi-
ciorum civilium institucio40.
Moreover, in his work Marsilius greatly stresses the extreme conflict that dis-
tinguished human relations, deeply marked by the innate desire that each indi-
vidual has for self-affirmation, assuring himself a “life worth living”41. And, in
37. See the observations made in G. Piaia, ‘Antiqui, moderni e via moderna’ in Marsilio da
Padova, in Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9 (1974), p. 331 and pp. 342 - 343: Piaia singles out what
is truly new about the way in which Marsilius approaches the problem of relations between
State and Church in the adoption of this method, that is in the application in the ecclesiolog-
ical field of the analytical instruments drawn up by the Greek philosopher.
38. Cf. Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacis, I, i, 3-7, R. Scholz (ed.), 2 vols., Hahnsche Buch-
handlung, Hanover, 1932-1933, vol. I, pp. 4 - 9.
39. Likewise the recourse to Augustine, on the other hand, in no way presupposes a passive ac-
ceptance of his political theology (nor of any other element of his system of thinking); on
this aspect, see C. Condren, On Interpreting Marsilius’ Use of St. Augustine, in Augustinia-
na, 25 (1975), pp. 220 - 222, and also bear in mind J. Scott Vecchiarelli, Influence or Ma-
nipulation? The Role of Augustinianism in the “Defensor Pacis” of Marsilius of Padua, in
Augustinian Studies, 9 (1978), pp. 59 - 79. As regards the idea that the reconstruction of
the origin of the political communities implemented by Marsilius is greatly indebted to the
Ciceronian doctrine according to which all men are distinguished by an inclination to con-
gregate of which, however, they must become aware by way of the rational argumentations
and persuasive capacities of the wisest amongst them, see C.J. Nederman, Nature, Sin and
the Origins of Society: the Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought, in Journal of
the History of Ideas, 49 (1988), pp. 19 - 26.
40. Defensor Pacis, I, vi, 1, p. 28/9 - 14.
41. Consider, for example, Defensor Pacis, I, v, 11, vol. I, p. 27/12 - 13 e II, viii, 9, vol. I, p. 229/19 -
21 (“est enim quilibet pronus ad commodum proprium prosequendum et incommodum
fugiendum”). Marsilius underlines how the only instruments capable of adequately neu-
tralising the conflict that the desire that each one has of “living and living well” can lead to,
preventing each member of the community to solely pursue his own personal advantage, are
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the rereading of Marsilius, the “natural tendency to associate oneself” which
was spoken about in the first few pages of the Politics is transformed into the
gradual awareness of the fact that the only way to assure oneself a “vita mun-
dana sufficiens” – more precisely, to make the achievement of that objective
“less difficult”42 – consists in becoming part of a community:
Ex supposito nobis in prioribus, quasi omnium in hoc libro demonstran-
dorum principio, videlicet: Omnes homines appetere sufficienciam vite et
oppositum declinare, per demonstracionem conclusimus ipsorum com-
municacionem civilem, quoniam per ipsam sufficienciam hanc adipisci
possunt, et preter eam minime. Propter quod eciam Aristoteles 1° Politice,
capitulo 1° inquit: Natura quidem igitur in omnibus impetus est ad talem
communitatem, civilem scilicet43.
a legislative body and a “guardian” empowered to enforce it: cf. ivi, I, iv, 4, p. 18/16 - 21 (“quia
inter homines congregatos eveniunt contenciones et rixe, que per normam iusticie non regu-
late causarent pugnas et hominum separacionem et sic demum civitatis corrupcionem, opor-
tuit in hac communicacione statuere iustorum regulam et custodem sive factorem”), I, xv, 6,
p. 89/14 - 22 (“Sine principatus inexistencia civilis communitas manere aut diu manere non
potest, quoniam necesse est ut scandala veniant, ut dicitur in Mattheo. Hee autem sunt con-
tenciones atque iniurie hominum invicem, que non vindicate aut mensurate per iustorum
regulam, legem videlicet, et per principantem, contingeret inde congregatorum hominum
pugna et separacio, et demum corrupcio civitatis et privacio sufficientis vite”) e I, xix, 12,
p. 135/132 - 15. The tendency to prevaricate over one’s neighbour, moreover, is to be traced
back to original sin, from which the human race has emerged weakened and sickly in the
soul and the body: cf. Defensor Pacis, I, vi, 2, pp. 29/24 - 30/5.
42. Cf. ivi, I, v, 11, p. 27.
43. Defensor pacis, I, xiii, 2, p. 70/14 - 22. Another theme in relation to which we witness – start-
ing from the late-13th century – the difficult search for a synthesis between the language of
political Aristotelianism and Pauline-Augustinian political theology is that of the legitimacy
of tyrannicide, a theme I have had the chance to deal with in a recent contribution: cf. S. Si-
monetta, Verso un punto di vista laico sulla questione del tirannicidio fra XII e XIII secolo,
in Doctor Virtualis, 9 (2009), especially pp. 74 - 77.
